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Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation

Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation by Kurt Annen
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This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.
International Monetary Fund; August 2012
37 pages; ISBN 9781475539240
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Title: Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation
Author: Kurt Annen; Luc Moers