The Leading eBooks Store Online 4,034,055 members ⚫ 1,328,001 ebooks

New to

Learn more

Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation

Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation by Michael Finus
Buy this eBook
US$ 40.00
(If any tax is payable it will be calculated and shown at checkout.)
‘Finus develops the important insights of game theory for understanding international environmental problems in a rigorous yet accessible manner. The book is extremely comprehensive, and will take readers should they choose to a high level of sophistication. However, Finus also places great emphasis on pointing out the intuition behind results, and this is very welcome. All in all, this is a book which many environmental economists will want on their bookshelves.’ – Nick Hanley, University of Glasgow, UK Since there is no supranational institution which can enforce international environmental agreements (IEAs), international cooperation proves difficult in practice. Global emissions exhibit negative externalities in countries other than that of their origin and hence there is a high interdependence between countries, and strategic considerations play an important role. Game theory analyses the interaction between agents and formulates hypotheses about their behavior and the final outcomes in games. Hence, international environmental problems are particularly suited for analysis by this method. The book investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede, agree and comply to an international environmental agreement (IEA). Finus shows that by integrating real world restrictions into a model, game theory is a powerful tool for explaining the divergence between ‘first-best’ policy recommendations and ‘second-best’ designs of actual IEAs. For instance he explains why (inefficient) uniform emission reduction quotas have played such a prominent role in past IEAs despite economists’ recommendations for the use of (efficient) market-based instruments as for example emission targets and permits. Moreover, it is stated, that a single, global IEA on climate is not necessarily the best strategy and small coalitions may enjoy a higher stability and may achieve more. This book will be of great interest to scholars, researchers and lecturers in the fields of international environmental economics, game theory and international relations.
Edward Elgar Publishing; March 2001
432 pages; ISBN 9781843762898
Read online, or download in secure PDF format
Title: Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation
Author: Michael Finus